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STEVEN FREDERIC LACHMAN*

Should Municipalities Be Liable for
Development-Related Flooding?**
ABSTRACT
Municipalities contribute to flooding when they permit new
construction without requiring drainage facilities adequate to
accommodate increased surface water runoff. Poor municipal
planningencourages urban sprawland vacant center cities, while
thefloodingcaused by poorplanningdeprives existing landowners
of investment-backed expectations. Flood planning is even more
important under conditions of global warming because cities may
be subject to more severe storms and coastal areas may be more
frequently inundatedby seawater.
Municipal liability for planning-related flood damage and
immunity therefrom are largely matters of common law. States
diverge as to municipal immunity and liability, supporting
rationales,causes of actions,and standardsof proof,Public policy
arguesforauniform doctrine of prospectivemunicipalliability that
limits flood damage and urban sprawl and protects existing
landownersbut does not penalize citiesfor planningmistakes made
under previous immunity doctrines.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this article, I propose that it is contrary to the public interest to
grant municipalities immunity from tort liability for damages suffered
from flooding where the municipality has contributed to the flooding
through the approval of building permits or of inadequate drainage
facilities. Immunity is contrary to the public interest for three reasons: (1)
urban development and sprawl have reduced the capacity of the land to
absorb water, resulting in greater runoff from storm events; (2) under
predicted global warming scenarios, storm events are likely to be more
severe, creating a greater risk of flooding; and (3) liability for the
consequences of improvidently issued building permits discourages urban
sprawl and promotes more condensed development, thus encouraging
resource conservation, especially for transportation, which in turn reduces
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the production of greenhouse gases. The evidence supporting the
inevitability of global warming is such that the editors of Science have
urged developed countries to reduce greenhouse emissions now.'
This article addresses the policy considerations for municipal flood
liability, analyzes the relevant case law, and then suggests a simple
workable rule prescribing when political subdivisions would and would
not be liable for damages caused by flooding. The article then concludes by
examining the legal ramifications of municipal flood liability.
II. POLICY REASONS FOR MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR
FLOODING
Under the predicted climate change scenarios, rainfall is expected
to become more variable and storm events more severe. A change in the
mean temperature and precipitation of one standard deviation-a likely
outcome for an atmosphere with double natural levels of carbon
dioxide-is nine times as likely to produce storms currently labeled as 100
year events, and 30 times as likely to produce storms now classified as
10,000 year events.2 If such predictions come true, protections limited to the
current 100-year floodplains will become inadequate. Moreover,
vulnerability to damage from even more moderate floods will multiply.
Storm clustering and storm severity are more important than measuring
changes in yearly precipitation. A study performed by Changnon and
Changnon showed an increase between 1954 and 1994 of weather related
catastrophes with damages over $100 million.4
Changnon and Demissie also examined the impact of weather and
population patterns on stream flooding in urban and rural areas of Illinois.
They found an increase in both precipitation and mean annual flow from
1940 to 1990. Most of the variations in flow were explained by changes in

1. See The Science of Climate Change, 292 SCIENCE 1261, 1261 (2001).
2. D. I. Smith, Greenhouse Climatic Change and Flood Damages, the Implications, 25
CLIMATIC CHANGE 319,320(1993).
3. Dong Wang & Larry Mayer, Effect of Storm Clusteringon Water Balance Estimates and
Its Implicationsfor Climate Impact Assessment, 27 CUMATIC CHANGE 321,321 (1994).
4. David Changnon & Stanley A. Changnon Jr., Evaluationof WeatherCatastropheData
for Use in Climate ChangeInvestigations,38 CLIMATICCHANGE 435,435 (1998). The study found
that much, but not all, of the increase in the costs of weather related catastrophes was
attributable to increases in population density and a shift of populations to regions susceptible
to weather-related disasters. The study was not able to consider changes in building design
and building codes.
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land use, with greater flooding occurring in urbanized areas, but increases
in precipitation were also a factor in raised levels of stream flow.Modem growth patterns exacerbate the flooding problem.
Suburbanization increases the land area that is paved or roofed and hence
impermeable. Rainfall thus becomes unabated surface flow. Cities zone for
large lots because doing so generates higher property values and
simultaneously places less strain on public services such as schools and
sewage. This yields a greater area of paved space per capita, leading to
more storm water runoff.6 To make matters worse, older industrial cities
have a decaying infrastructure less capable than ever of addressing
flooding, and suburbanization has deprived them of the tax base necessary
to improve their infrastructure.
These are the reasons that municipalities must be made
accountable for their storm and sewage waters. In light of older cities'
economic plight and the causation of flooding by suburban sprawl, the fair
solution may be to share the burden of flood control and flood liability
regionally. Unfortunately, political and watershed boundaries seldom
match. This article does not focus on regional coordination, but it is hoped
that municipal liability for flooding may encourage regional coordination
as one equitable way to adapt to climate change. 8
III. THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR FLOODING
In the context of this article, the terms "city" and "municipality"
are used interchangeably. They mean any political subdivision that permits
or fosters urban growth or constructs or regulates sewage and drainage
systems associated with urban development. The majority of court
decisions favor municipal immunity for flooding related to development,
though there does not appear to be a consistent trend in this area of the
law. In some circumstances, the result is supported by statutory,
constitutional, or common law sovereign immunity. Other jurisdictions
treat municipal liability for flooding as an extension of private flooding
liability under common law water discharge rights that address the right

5. Stanley A. Changnon & Misganaw Demissie, Detection ofChanges in Streamflow and
Floods Resultingfrom Climate Fluctuations and Land Use-DrainageChanges,32CLMATICCHANGE

411,411 (1996).
6. See generally William Goldfarb &Byron King, Urban Stormwater Runoff, 11 REAL EST.
L. J. 3 (1982); Chester L Arnold, Jr. & James C. Gibbons, Impervious Surface Coverage: The
Emergence of a Key Environmental Indicator, 62 J.AMERICAN PLAN. ASS'N 243 (1993).
7. William Goldfarb, Watershed Management: Slogan or Solution, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 483,484 (1994).

8. See generally James K. Mitchell &Neil J.Erickson, Effects of Climate Change on WeatherRelated Disasters, in CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE 141 (Irving Mintzer, ed. 1992).
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of a landowner to discharge water from his/her property onto the property
of another landowner.9
Few states have developed a consistent policy toward municipal
liability for flooding damage, and fewer still have based their policy upon
a reasoned analysis. Most often, decisions rest entirely upon stare decisis.
McQufllin, in Law of Municipal Corporations,has attempted to summarize
the law of municipal flood liability:
Under this rule, while municipal authorities may pave and
grade streets and are not ordinarily liable for an increase in
surface water naturally falling on the land of a private owner
where the work is properly done, they are not permitted to
concentrate and gather such water into artificial drains or
channels and throw it on the land of an individual owner in
such manner and volume as to cause substantial injury to
such land and without making adequate provision for its
proper outflow unless compensation is made, and for breach
of duty in this respect an action will lie....
So too, where a village furnishes a building permit to a
contractor for the development of an industrial complex
which benefits the village financially, but which also
diminishes the surface area available for the drainage of
water, causing the flooding of neighboring servient estates,
liability for damages resulting from the increased flooding
rests with the village rather than with the individual lower
riparian owners."0
Thus, McQuillin suggests that municipalities are indeed liable
where permitting of construction or diversion of water results in the
flooding of lower riparian lands but are not liable for their own
construction activities. The law varies so much from state to state, however,
that McQuillin's summary is of dubious value. McQuillin's summary fails
to explain why liability should or should not attach.
Conflicts in this area of law occur in several recurring situations.
They occur when excessive waters flow from the upstream property (or
dominant estate) onto that of the downstream property (or servient estate),
when water from the downstream property backs up onto the upstream
property, or when water overflows an easement onto a dominant estate."

9. See, e.g., Looney v. Hindman, 649 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. 1983); see also Bailey v. Floyd, 416
So. 2d 404 (Ala. 1982) (addressing flows outside of a municipality).
10. 18A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.144 (3d ed. 1993).
11. An easement is a right to use or control land the easement-holder does not own, but
for a specific or limited purpose, such as maintaining a utility pole. The land that benefits
from an easement is known as the dominantestate, whereas the land burdened by an easement
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Typically, a city has constructed a sewage or storm drainage system but
continued urban growth makes these channels inadequate to carry the
runoff from storms. Water may then flow over a plaintiff's property,
creating a trespass.12 Sometimes damage occurs (e.g. landslides, sewage in
basements), raising the level of tort from trespass to nuisance. 3 Where the
flooding is continuous, it may be viewed as a taking. 4
Municipal involvement proceeds along a continuum. In the least
culpable circumstance, the municipality may have only failed to inspect a
private development or drainage ditch, or it may have issued a permit for
development that increased downstream flows. The development may
have been designed and constructed to comply with a city's master plan.
Sometimes the water flows directly from city property onto the plaintiff's
land, such as from an overflowing storm sewer. The basis for liability may
be the city's failure to maintain the storm sewer or the failure to construct
a sewer large enough to handle flows. A good jumping off point is
therefore the consideration of whether it is a municipality's duty to provide
channels for run-off and sewerage.
A. Municipal Duties
Municipalities, as chartered creations of the state, may be thought
of as bodies representing the common good. Municipal liability shares the
burden of poor planning with the entire community and does not visit it
just upon a few innocents. The risk of liability encourages the thoughtful
planning necessary to adapt to a changing environment. This adaptation
reduces the overall burden to the community as a whole.

is known as the seruientestate. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 527 (7th ed. 1999).
12. A trespass to land occurs when a person unlawfully enters or remains on another
person's property, or, as is most relevant to municipal flood liability, places or projects any
object upon another's property without lawful justification. Id. at 1509. See also Graybill v.
Providence Township, 593 A.2d 1314, 1319 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
13. A nuisance is a condition or situation that interferes with the use or enjoyment of
property. Implicit in a nuisance is that the tortfeasor, or person causing the nuisance, acted
unreasonably or failed in a duty to act reasonably. A nuisance may be continuing, in that it
may occur repeatedly. BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY, supranote 11,at 1094. Seealso Fulton County
v. Wheaton, 310 S.E.2d 910,911 (Ga. 1984).
14. A Constitutional taking occurs when the government acquires private property by
"ousting the owner and claiming title or by destroying the property or severely impairing its
utility," or "when government action directly interferes with or substantially disturbs the
owner's use and enjoyment of the property." BLACK'SLAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 1467.
See also Marty v. State, 838 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Idaho 1992); Menick v. City of Menasha, 547
N.W.2d 778,780 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
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Municipalities have the authority to abate nuisances."5 The
abatement of nuisances by a municipality is discretionary, however. The
failure of a city to abate a public nuisance does not create a right of action
against the city. Courts will not normally interfere in decisions to abstain
from abatement. 6
Consistent with the discretionary authority of municipalities to
abate nuisances, the common law rule is that municipalities are under no
duty to provide sewerage to their constituents."' States disagree as to
whether, once a city has undertaken to provide sewerage, it has an
obligation to upgrade the service to handle additional inflows. Texas courts
have ruled that cities need not upgrade existing sewerage for two reasons:
First, doing so would discourage cities from implementing any sewerage,
because once they began a sewerage program they would incur the
expense of future upgrades-since partial sewerage is better than none at
all, it is better to encourage cities to provide at least limited sewerage.
Second, judicial review of municipal sewerage decisions would breach the
separation of judicial and legislative powers:
To award damages in a private action for insufficient
drainage...would be to permit use of the judicial process to
supervise the planning and construction of public
improvements. Municipal fiscal policy, instead of being set
for the city as a whole by the elected representatives of the
people, would be subject to piecemeal review and revision by
courts in separate actions concerned primarily with the
interests of one or more individual landowners....""'
On the other hand, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in City of
Louisville v. Cope, held that a city that constructs a sewer system has an

15. 6A EUGENE McQUILLIN, LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.88 (3d ed. 1997). See
generally Town of Dartmouth v. Silva, 90 N.E.2d 832,835 (Mass. 1950); City of Washington v.
Mueller, 218 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949), Joseph v. City of Austin, I01 S.W.2d 381,
384 (Tex. Ct. App. 1936).
16. See City and County of Denver v. Ristau, 33 P.2d 387,388 (Colo. 1934). New York
communities are under no affirmative duty to abate or prevent flooding. O'Donnell v. City
of Syracuse, 76 N.E. 738, 740 (N.Y. 1906). Accord Office Park Corp. v. County of Onondaga,
409 N.Y.S.2d 54,858 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
17. 18A EUGENE McQUILLIN, LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.119 (3d ed.1993).
18. Norman &Schaen, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 536 S.W.2d 428,430 (Tex. App. 1976). Accord
City of Watuga v. Taylor, 752 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. App. 1988). New York decisions are in
agreement with Texas. See, e.g., Vanguard Tours, Inc. v. Town of Yorktown, 442 N.Y.S.2d 19,
20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (citing Beck v. New York, 199 N.Y.S.2d 584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960)). See
also Morain v. City of Norman, 863 P.2d 1246,1251 (Okla. 1993) (stating that because cities are
under no obligation to install sewerage, they cannot be held liable for approving development
that exceeds the capacity of sewerage. Moreover, the city is not liable because it does not
exercise dominion over the source of the flooding).
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obligation to insure that the system remains adequate, even if there is
additional growth in the city." The Kentucky courts treat sewers as
artificial drainages. Under the natural course rule, once the city has altered
the flow through these drains, it is responsible to ensure that no damages
result from the flows. Pennsylvania adopts a similar view."
The logic of both the Texas and Kentucky courts has appeal. On
one hand, if a municipality has no common law duty to install sewerage,
then it certainly should have no duty to install complete sewerage.
However, is it fair to the landowner who builds believing in the reliance of
an adequate sewer system to have his expectation eviscerated because the
city now allows the system to service more flow than its capacity? Is it fair
to the pre-existing landowner to be burdened with sewage that would not
be there but for the city's construction of municipal sewerage works? Texas
courts indulge in a fiction that ignores that the city creates the excess
burden on the sewerage system by approving development.
Ultimately, the choice between these two options boils down to a
question of public policy. The underlying premise that a city has no
obligation to install sewage facilities is false because the Federal Clean
Water Act prohibits unpermitted point-source discharges of pollution.2
Sewage service is now an expected amenity of urban and suburban living.
This undercuts the Texas argument that liability for flooding and backup
will discourage the construction of sewerage facilities. Nor does there
appear to be evidence to support a conclusion that creating municipal
liability for inadequate sewerage leads to a surfeit of litigation, or that in
the jurisdictions that approve such liability, it has led to excessive judicial
interference with municipal planning functions.
Adoption of the Kentucky rule does, on the other hand, promote
better municipal planning, and it enables landowners to rely on their
reasonable expectations as to the value of their property. It also confines
growth to areas that have either the infrastructure or the natural capacity
to handle runoff.

19. City of Louisville v. Cope, 176 S.W.2d 390 (Ky. 1943); accord City of Harrodsburg v.
Yeast, 247 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952). Arizona's Supreme Court concurs. In City of Tucson
v. Apache Motors, 245 P.2d 255,260 (Ariz. 1952), it observed, "although no legal duty devolved
upon the city of Tucson to construct the culverts here involved, but having undertaken to do
so, it was required under the law to build culverts of sufficient size to adequately carry away
all water accustomed to flow, or which may be reasonably anticipated to flow down such
arroyo as a result of rains upon the watershed which it drained. Having failed to do this it
was, in law, guilty of negligence...."
20. See City of Philadelphia v. Messantonio, 533 A.2d 1127 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987)
(holding that once a city has undertaken the discretionary act of installing a traffic light, it is
under a duty to maintain the device).
21. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
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B. Sovereign Immunity and Statutory Liability
Because municipal liability is generally premised on principles of
nuisance, trespass, or common law water rights, statutory grounds are
infrequently cited as the basis for municipal liability. As an exception,
Louisiana's determination is based upon Section 2315 of its Civil Code':
"Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another, obliges him by
whose fault it happened to repair it." In Eschete v. City of New Orleans,' the
plaintiff alleged that the city's approval of new subdivisions resulted in
flooding of his property. The Louisiana Supreme Court relied upon Section
2315 and reversed the trial court's dismissal of the lawsuit, holding that
allegations of the city's foreknowledge of flooding, combined with damage,
were sufficient to sustain the suit.' Although made easier by its statutory
foundation, the Louisiana decision is nonetheless elegant in its simple logic.
The city caused an injury through its error and is therefore liable.
Many states still protect their municipalities from suit under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity originated in the
English common law and was premised upon the king's infallibility. When
the doctrine was imported into the American common law, its rationale
was more basic: government could not afford to do its job if it were always
financially liable for its misdeeds.' The unfairness of the doctrine to the
individual was mitigated with the 1946 passage of the Federal Tort Claims
Act.2 The Federal Tort Claims Act has been interpreted to waive immunity
for non-discretionary activities but not for discretionary ones.27 State courts

22. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001). Unlike the other 49 states,
Louisiana is a civil law jurisdiction. Instead of relying on the rich tradition of common law
inherited originally from Roman law but more recently from English jurisprudence, Louisiana
law is more determined by code and places more emphasis on the rights of individuals as
opposed to government. Robert Pascal, Louisiana Civil Law and Its Study, 60 LA. L. REV. 1, 1

(1999).
23. 245 So. 2d 383 (La. 1971). Accord Pennebaker v. Parish of Jefferson, 383 So. 2d 484 (La.
Ct. App. 1980); McCloud v. Parish of Jefferson, 383 So. 2d 477 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (but note
Judge Chehardy's vigorous dissent). See also Falgout v. St. Charles Sewerage District #3, 351
So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (holding municipal utility strictly liable for damages from a
sewage back-up because the plaintiff's property was compelled by statute to be attached to
the municipal sewerage system).
24. Eschete v. City of New Orleans, 245 So. 2d at 385.
25. Amy Hall, Comment, The Immunity Provision of the Flood Control Act: Does It Have a
ProperRole after the Demise of Sovereign Immunity?, 31 MCGEORGE L. REv. 77,83 (1999).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2671-2680 (1994).
27. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,34 (1953).
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have generally followed the federal lead in the abrogation of traditional
sovereign immunity.'
In Wilson v. Ramacher, Minnesota's Supreme Court said, "[s]ome
services to the public cannot be effectively accomplished if performance of
these services is chilled by concern for second-guessing by a tort
litigant.... "29 The court's conclusion, however, is more assumption than
fact. It dodges the real policy questions: (1) Would lawsuits for improper
approval of development hinder municipal function? (2) Does sovereign
immunity, if it protects improper development, benefit or harm the
community? and (3) Is the application of sovereign immunity fair to
injured persons?
In the municipal arena, courts have applied two different doctrines
to protect cities from flood liability under the rule of sovereign immunity:
the discretionary/non-discretionary distinction and the proprietary
function/governmental function distinction. Texas applies both doctrines:
1. When a municipal corporation acts in its private capacity,
for the benefit only of those within its corporate limits, and
not as an arm of the government, it is liable for the
negligence of its representatives.
2. A municipal corporation is not liable for the negligence of
its agents and employees in the performance of purely
governmental matters solely for the public benefit...."
Governmental immunity protects a city when it exercises
discretionary powers of a public nature involving judicial or
legislative functions....The City's design and planning of its
culvert system are quasi-judicial functions subject to
governmental immunity. 1
In another case, the Texas Supreme Court found that flood
damages related to a subdivision fell within sovereign immunity. "In this
case, plat approval is a discretionary function that only a governmental
unit can perform. By definition, a quasijudicial exercise of the police power
is exclusively the province of the sovereign." By comparison, the court

28. See, e.g., Hurley v. Town of Hudson, 296 A.2d 905 (N.H. 1972).
29. 352 N.W.2d 389,393 (Minn. 1984) (the city of Lino Lakes was held to have immunity
in its decision to approve a subdivision).
30. City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 501 (Tex. 1997) (quoting Dilley v. City of
Houston, 222 S.W.2d 992,993 (Tex. 1949). In City of Tyler, the city was held immune from a
suit alleging negligence in the planning of a culvert system.
31. Id. at 501.
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characterized maintenance of a storm sewer as a non-discretionary
governmental function for which the state can be held liable.32
Texas's search for a bright line determiner of liability raises the
question, Are plat approval and the issuance of building and subdivision
permits truly discretionary activities? Some state appellate courts believe
that the approval of building permits is not really a discretionary municipal
function. In Winters v. Commerce City,' the Colorado Court of Appeals
found that the denial of a building permit was ministerial, not
discretionary, because grant or denial of the permits was compelled by set
rule and did not require discretion on the part of the government agency.
As a consequence, the municipality did not receive blanket immunity.
Similarly, the Arizona Court of Appeals observed, "The issuance of a
building permit appears to us to be more of an administrative or executive
function rather than legislative."' 4 For states wishing to preserve their
immunity for municipal discretionary decisions, it would be advisable for
their courts to examine whether the permits are granted as a matter of right
if all the criteria are met, or whether the municipality has any real
discretion in the issuance of such permits. Merely because the approval of
developments is done by a planning agency does not mean that such
approvals are discretionary planning activities.
Like Texas, Maryland grants its political subdivisions a limited
sovereign immunity for the performance of its governmental functions but
not its proprietary responsibilities.' In Irvine v. Montgomery County,' the
county issued permits for excavation, grading, and paving of streets as part
of subdivision development. This construction activity diverted water onto
the plaintiff's property. The court said, "[Iln issuing permits for
construction a municipality is only exercising its governmental authority
and is immune from action against it"; and "[e]ven though the permits
were for street construction, the municipal corporation is immune from
liability for error of judgment."37 These statements would seem to shut the
door on municipal liability but for a caveat near the end of the opinion:
"Here the bill of complaint does not allege any acts of negligence on the
part of the county in approving the plan of subdivision, or any failure of
the plan, in respect of streets, to conform to the specifications of the county

32. City of Round Rock v. Smith, 687 S.W.2d 300, 303 (Tex. 1985). See also City of Fort
Worth v. Adams, 888 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. App. 1994).
33. 648 P.2d 175 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
34. Bischofshausen v. Pinal-Gila Counties, 673 P.2d 307,308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
35. Snyder v. State Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, 391 A.2d 863, 866-67 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1978).
36. Irvine v. Montgomery County, 239 Md. 113,210 A.2d 359 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1965).
Accord Spriggs v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 298 A.2d 442,445 (Md. 1973).
37. Irvine v. Montgomery County, 210 A.2d at 361.
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code. " ' So, had the county been negligent in the performance of its
permitting duties, liability might have resulted.
The Virginia Circuit Court of Appeals, in Linda Lee Corp. v.
Covington Co., 39 relied upon the proprietary/governmental function
distinction to relieve the city of Bedford of liability for flood damages
caused by the construction of a shopping center without an adequate
stormwater drainage system. The plaintiff argued that the city was
negligent both in failing to construct an adequate system and in approving
the construction of the shopping center without an adequate system. Not
confident in the soundness of its rationale, the Virginia court added an
alternative basis for exemption-the public duty doctrine-holding that
sovereign immunity applies where the city function is to serve the public
at large, and not individual citizens. The public duty doctrine thus seems
to mirror the proprietary/governmental function distinction. It raises the
question of whether the issuance of a building permit is designed to protect
the public at large, or a particular segment.
New Jersey goes even further in granting immunity. As long as a
governmental decision or action is made in good faith, sovereign immunity
attaches, even if the municipality acted negligently.' In New Jersey, "if a
sewer is adequate when constructed the municipality is not liable because
of subsequent inadequacy occasioned by the growth of the municipality
and the increased demands made upon the sewer."41 The New Jersey

38. Id.
39. 36 Va. Cir. 590 (1993). Forit's public duty rationale, the Court relied upon the West
Virginia case of Wolfe v. City of Wheeling, 387 S.E.2d 307,311 (W. Va. 1989), which in turn had
relied upon the New York case of Cuffy v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 937,940 (N.Y. 1987).
In Cuffy, the court held that the city was not liable for its failure to provide police protection
to a landlord who had been injured by a tenant after the landlord requested police protection.
The New York Supreme Court held that liability on the part of the government would exist
only if four criteria were met: (1)an assumption by local government entity, through promises
or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge
on the part of the local government entity's agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some
form of direct contact between the local government entity's agents and the injured party; and
(4) that party's justifiable reliance on the local government entity's affirmative undertaking.
Id. Thus, the only element missing in the Virginia case is direct contact between the
government and the flooding victim. It is worth questioning why the absence of contact
between victim and regulator should absolve the regulator, where the regulator has at least
constructive knowledge of the potential harm. A more logical test would be simply whether
the regulator was negligent in not accounting for the potential for flood damage.
40. In Panepinto, v. Edmark, Inc., 323 A.2d 533 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1974), the court denied
recovery against the city of Bayonne for flooding caused by the city's failure to inspect a sewer
line.
41. Barney's Furniture Warehouse v. City of Newark, 303 A.2d 76,82 (N.J. 1973).
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Supreme Court has recently noted that the purpose of New
Jersey's Tort
3
Claims Law"2 was to create immunities, not remove them.
Other jurisdictions attach liability only if the watercourse or pipe
from which the flood waters originated is owned by the government entity.
Thus, two California cases adjudged municipalities liable in trespass for
flooding where the cities approved and accepted privately constructed
drainage systems,"' and two California cases found the cities immune
where the offending drainage system was not actually owned by the
cities.45 It did not matter that the government approved or permitted the
private subdivision plans or sewage systems that generated the
floodwaters; the determinative issue was ownership.
Some courts determine municipal liability according to common
law water discharge rights, even if the city does not own the floodway. The
Minnesota Supreme Court has suggested that common law water
discharge rules are inapplicable to political subdivisions of the state,
because the state owns no estate, but rather derives its control over land
from its sovereignty, making the issue of flood liability strictly a question
of sovereign immunity.4 Most jurisdictions gloss over this distinction.
If, however, as proposed above by the Minnesota Supreme Court,
the municipality owns no estate and is strictly a child of the sovereign, then
is not all of its activity governmental, and any distinction between
proprietary and governmental function false? The approval of subdivision
development and the construction or acceptance of storm sewers are both
governmental actions in furtherance of the common good. Where a city
approves a subdivision plat without provision for adequate drainage, or
where it physically constructs a too-narrow storm sewer, the net result is
the same: flooding. Both are the result of poor planning by the
municipality. It is illogical to allow a city to shoulder responsibility for one
but not the other.
The United States Supreme Court has also questioned the validity
of distinguishing between proprietary and governmental municipal

42. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 through 1-7 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001).
43. Russo Farms v. Board of Education, 675 A.2d 1077 (N.J. 1996) (summary judgment
in favor of municipality denied in lawsuit for flooding damages allegedly caused by the city's
failure to enlarge the sewer system following the construction of a new school).
44. Matin v. City of San Rafael, 168 Cal. Rptr. 750 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), and Frustuck v.
City of Fairfax, 28 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963). An older Iowa case, Damour v. Lyons
City, 44 Iowa 276 (1876), created municipal liability for flooding based upon the city
permitting the construction of a railroad embankment.
45. Yox v. City of Whittier, 227 Cal. Rptr. 311 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Ulleryv. Contra Costa
County, 248 Cal. Rptr. 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
46. 352 N.W.2d 389,394 (Minn. 1984).
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functions. In Owen v. City of Independence, 7 the Court noted that there was
no consistency among the states in the interpretation of the doctrine. It
went on to state that "[a] comparative study of the cases in the forty-eight
States will disclose an irreconcilable conflict. More than that, the decisions
in each of the States are disharmonious and disclose the inevitable chaos
when courts try to apply a rule of law that is inherently unsound."'
C. Common Law Water Discharge Rights
A common source of flood liability rulings is the common law of
water discharge rights.49 Using the common law approach, one can treat
the municipality as an upstream landowner, attributing water discharges
to the municipality, if it permitted them.
Three distinct doctrines define this field. The "common-enemy"
rule holds that every landowner has the right to discharge water from his
property and to protect itself from the inflow of water onto his property,
even if he or she harms the downstream landowner in the process.' The
upstream owner is given primacy. This rule reflects an attitude that
landowners have absolute rights of control over their own property and
that development is the highest and best use of any land.5
Few jurisdictions still follow a pure common-enemy rule. 2 Even
common-enemy states have modified the rule so as to consider the impact
on the lower or servient estate and to consider how much of the flow has
been artificially modified.s' These considerations mitigate the potential
harshness of the common-enemy rule.
47. 445 U.S. 622,645 n.26 (1980).
48. Id. (quoting IndianTowing Co. v.United States, 350 U.S. 61,65 (1955) (on rehearing)).

49. See, e.g., State v. Feenan, 752 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1988); Rau v. Wilden Acres, 103 A.2d
422 (Pa. 1954).
50.

Myotte v. Village of Mayfield, 375 N.E.2d 816, 818 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977). See also

Bailey v. Floyd, 416 So. 2d 404,404 (Ala. 1982) ("Each landowner has an unqualified right to
divert the surface waters without incurring legal consequences, while other landowners

possess the duty and right to protect themselves from the effects of this diversion.").
51. JOSEPH L.SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 92 (3d ed. 2000).
52. See, e.g., Heins Implement Co. v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 859 S.W. 2d 681
(Mo. 1993) (rejecting the common-enemy rule for the reasonable use approach because the
diversion of additional waters onto lower lands can be viewed as a trespass).
53. In State v.Feenan, 752 P.2d at 260, the court held that even though under the commonenemy rule a landowner is not liable for vagrant waters that cross from his lands to his
neighbor's, the landowner is nevertheless required to exercise reasonable care in avoiding
damage to the neighbor's property. More importantly, the Montana Supreme Court held that
the common enemy rule is not a defense to governmental obligations to compensate
landowners whose property has been taken through government-caused flooding. Id.

Missouri also applies a "modified common-enemy rule," disallowing destructive flows of
water that exceed the natural capacity drainages and discharge onto lands upon which they
would not naturally drain. Looney v. Hindman, 649 S.W.2d 207,211 (Mo. 1983).
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The natural watercourse doctrine (also known as the "civil law" or
"natural flow" rule) grants the right to discharge any amount or rate of
water so long as it is discharged into its natural receiving watercourse and
is not artificially diverted,' This rule arbitrarily emphasizes the ultimate
channel conveying the storm drainage. If the water would have naturally
flowed down the particular river or drainage ditch, then it matters not that
its excess floods private property.55
The natural watercourse doctrine ignores the fact that but for
additional development, ground absorption would have delayed and
lessened the amount of water reaching the conveyance, and the water
would not have overflowed the banks onto private property.56 Thus, while
the watercourse may be natural, the flow is not, so the distinction between
artificial and natural made by the courts is false. The source of the damage
to the property owner is just as artificial as if the water were diverted.
The "reasonable use" rule seeks a more equitable sharing of
burdens between upper and lower landowners but, in so doing, it is less
clearly defined:
Where a lower riparian landowner stands to be seriously
damaged by the actions of an upper riparian landowner,
who, at a relatively small expense, is in a position to avoid

54. In Rau v.Wilden Acres, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court elaborated on the nature of
the natural watercourse doctrine:
A landowner may not alter the natural flow of surface water on his property
by concentrating it in an artificial channel and discharging it upon the lower
land of his neighbor even though no more water is thereby collected than
would naturally have flowed upon the neighbor's land in a diffused
condition. One may make improvements upon his own land, especially in
the development of urban property, grade it and build upon it, without
liability for any incidental effect upon adjoining property even though there
may result some additional flow of surface water thereon through a natural
watercourse, but he may not, by artificial means, gather the water into a
body and precipitate it upon his neighbor's property. Even a municipality,
while not liable to a property owner for an increased flow of surface water
over his land arising merely from changes in the character of the surface
produced by the opening of streets and the building of houses in the
ordinary and regular course of the expansion of the city, may not divert the
water onto another's land through the medium of artificial channels.
103 A.2d at 423-24.
55. Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 913 P.2d 119, 127 (Kan. 1996) (Construction of
a bridge resulted in river water overflowing its banks. Because the water merely overflowed
its usual route, but did not choose a different course, the County would have been immune
under the natural watercourse rule, except that the County ran afoul of a statute that deprived
the County of immunity where it fails to obtain the proper bridge permit.).
56. "Alterations to a natural watercourse, such as the construction of conduits or other
improvements in the bed of the stream, do not affect its status as a 'natural' watercourse."
Locklin v. City of Lafayette, 867 P.2d. 724, 734 (Cal. 1994).
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the harm threatened to the servient owner's estate, it is only
reasonable and fair that the offending landowner bear the
burden of his own actionsY
General principles of fairness justify this rule, but the decision of how
much of a burden the upper and lower owners must bear can only be
resolved on a case-by-case basis."
Nevada, in its aridity, has visited this issue but once. In County of
Clark v. Powers," as part of the county's master plan, lands immediately to
the west of the plaintiffs' land were developed, diverting water so as to
flood the plaintiff's property. The Nevada Supreme Court held the County
liable for trespass from the diversion of the water for two reasons. First, the
county's involvement was greater than just the grant of permits to private
builders-the county actually drafted the master plan that created the
flooding condition. Second, the court applied a reasonable use rule:
Our prior cases, however, have enunciated three central
principles: one, the law of water rights must be flexible,
taking notice of the varying needs of various localities; two,
a landowner may make reasonable use of his land as long as
he does not injure his neighbor; and three, a landowner
should not be permitted to make his land more valuable at
the expense of the estate of a lower landowner....
By contrast, the natural flow rule, restricted by definition, to
a rigid application of the laws of nature and the boundaries
of natural watercourses, is ill-suited to the complexities of
urban growth and expansion....
[L]andowners, developers, and local officials must take into
account the full costs of development to the community prior
to the implementation of their plans.'
This last quoted portion of the County of Clark decision strikes at
the heart of the liability issue. For our society, are the costs of expansion
going to be borne by those private individuals who seek to profit through
expansion, by the public as a whole, or by downstream landowners who
happen to be unfortunately placed?

57. Myotte v. Village of Mayfield, 375 N.E.2d 816, 819 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (citing
Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4, 10 (N.J. 1956); Masley v. City of Lorain, 358 N.E.2d
596 (Ohio 1976)).
58. See Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4,10 (N.J. 1956). In this private dispute, the
New Jersey Supreme Court implies that because the project causing the flooding is of high
utility, the burden may be imposed upon the servient estate.
59. County of Clark v. Powers, 611 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Nev. 1980).
60. Id. at 1075,1076.
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The Ohio Court of Appeals likewise relied upon reasonable use
standards in its decision in Myotte v. VillageofMayfield. 1Myotte's property
was flooded following the construction of an upstream industrial park. The
Village of Mayfield augmented its 48-inch sewer pipe with a 42-inch pipe,
but this still proved inadequate. After quoting from the Ohio Supreme
Court case of Masley v. City of Lorain, the Court of Appeals held that the
Village of Mayfield's failure to provide adequate drainage was
unreasonable in light of the cost of doing so, and the fact that it received tax
revenue from the industrial park.'
The Myotte decision is interesting for two reasons. First, it runs
contrary to the notion that a municipality has no duty to "keep up" with
runoff from development. Second, although relying upon Masley v. City of
Lorain, Myotte's logic is contrary to that expressed in Masley. The Court in
Masley held that a city may not plan and build a storm sewer system
knowing it to be insufficient, and therefore likely to cause flooding. The
Court also said, however, that municipalities are not liable for flooding
from increased development:
The correct principle of these cases is that a municipal
corporation may make reasonable use of a natural
watercourse to drain surface water, and will not be liable for
incidental damages which maybe considered damnum absque
injuria. It is also not liable for increased flow caused simply
by improvement of lots and streets.63
This leaves Ohio law in disarray. The more recent decision in
Myotte comes from a lower appellate court, relies upon the Ohio Supreme
Court's decision in Masley, and is more widely cited than the Supreme
Court decision. Myotte applies a reasonable use test, while Masley applies
a modified version of the natural watercourse doctrine. Myotte holds a
municipality responsible for waters from a privately owned industrial park
for which the village was only the owner of the streets and sewers, while
Masley exonerates the city from liability "caused simply by improvement
of lots and streets." Myotte suggests that a municipality has a duty to
modify its sewage facilities to accommodate urban growth, while Masley
confines liability to when a municipality knowingly plans and builds
inadequate sewer systems.
Courts have been reluctant to modify common law water discharge
rights without legislative authority. In Baldwin v. City of OverlandPark," the
plaintiffs complained that additional flows in a drainage ditch, resulting

61.
62.
63.
64.

Myotte v. Village of Mayfield, 375 N.E.2d at 819.
Id. at 820.
Masley v. City of Lorain, 358 N.E.2d 596,600 (Ohio 1976).
Baldwin v. City of Overland Park, 468 P.2d 168,170 (Kan. 1970).
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from upstream development, were causing a nuisance-debris, odor, and
mosquitoes. In choosing to perpetuate the natural drainage rule, the Kansas
Supreme Court observed, "Where rapid growth has occurred the resultant
problem is primarily an economic one for cities and citizenry, and under
the present state of our law, its solution properly lies in concerted political
action rather than in the courts."5
Where a policy of immunity is firmly established in statute or
common law, such deference to legislative bodies seems merited. Baldwin,
however, is not rooted in a long-standing policy of municipal immunity.
The court offers no explanation as to why the courts are not the proper
arena to settle competing water and property rights.
D. Urban Growth as a Defense to Liability
Municipal ownership of drainage facilities as a prerequisite to
liability can lead to inequitable results. In LaForm v. Bethlehem Township,"
a woman whose car had stalled along a flooded roadway drowned when
she fell in a drainage ditch, the borders of which were obscured by the
floodwaters. The drowning took place in Bethlehem Township, but the
majority of the waters came from the City of Bethlehem. A jury
apportioned the negligence between the City, the Township, and the state
highway department at 51 percent, 34 percent, and 15 percent, respectively.
Pennsylvania's Superior Court reversed, holding that because the City did
not artificially divert its drainage, it was not responsible for waters that
flowed off its property, even though downstream Bethlehem Township
had complained about the increased flow of water from the City and had
unsuccessfully attempted to reach an agreement with the City for the joint
installation of an adequate drainage system.' The court said a city is not
responsible for "the effects of an incidental increase in surface waters
flowing in a natural channel when the increase is owing to the normal,
gradual development of the city."' By providing two separate rationales
for its decision (lack of ownership at the locus of injury and immunity from
the effects of gradual growth), the LaFormcourt made ambiguous whether
either rationale stands on its own.
In a penetrating dissent, Judge Spaeth attacked the LaForm
adjudication from another angle. The common law of water discharge
liability upon which the court relied addresses the relative rights of
neighboring landowners. As Spaeth notes, however, the victim in LaForm
was not a landowner but an automobile driver. Thus, the court should have

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 173. Accord Gaines v. Pierce County, 834 P.2d 631,634 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
LaForm v. Bethlehem Township, 499 A.2d 1373,1374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
Id. at 1383-84.
Id. at 1379 (citing Strauss v. Allentown, 63 A. 1073 (Pa. 1906)).
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focused its analysis not on whether the City of Bethlehem had the right to
discharge its water, but rather on whether it had a duty of care to the
victim, and if it was negligent in the exercise of that duty.' If, as Judge
Spaeth suggested, the focus is shifted from the issue of water rights to that
of duty of care, it should not matter that the victim was killed on Bethlehem
Township property if the source of the injury was from the City of
Bethlehem, unless the duty of care ends with one's political boundaries."
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in LaForm did not explain its
distinction between liability for waters from rapid, as opposed to gradual,
development. If there is a distinction, it should pull in the other direction.
With slow growth, a municipal planning agency has more time to
contemplate adequate measures to protect its citizens than when faced with
an economic boom. The court offers no bright line to distinguish between
"rapid" and "normal" development, but perhaps the better rule is that
regardless of how swift the pace of expansion is a municipality owes a duty
to its citizens to not allow flood damage to result from growth.
Some jurisdictions modify their water discharge rules according to
whether the locale is urban or rural. For example, in Alabama, outside of
a municipal boundary, the civil law/natural drainage rule applies. Within
municipal boundaries a strict common-enemy rule governs." With
suburban sprawl blurring of urban-rural distinctions, imposing separate
water discharge rules is outmoded in the twenty-first century.' No longer
should urban development be encouraged at the expense of green space
and agricultural lands. To accommodate urban crowding, city residents
deserve protection from unnatural flooding.

69. Id. at 1386-88. Judge Spaeth relies in part upon Cooperv. City of Reading,104 A.2d 792
(Pa. 1958), and Decker v. City of Scranton, 25 A. 36 (Pa. 1892). The plaintiff in Decker
successfully sued for injuries incurred when his sleigh overturned on ice resulting from a
broken water main.
70. See Mark Downs, Inc. v. McCormick Props., Inc., 441 A.2d 1119,1127 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1982) (stating that "[ilt
is not necessary that the offending property abut, orbe 'adjacent'
to, that of the complainants to afford a cause of action").
71. Bailey v. Floyd, 416 So. 2d 404, 405 (Ala. 1982). However, in Street v. Tackett, 494 So.2d
13, 15 (Ala.1986), the Alabama Supreme Court held that where water from an incorporated
area flowed onto land in an unincorporated area, the civil rule, not the common-enemy rule,
governed. Illinois also distinguishes between urban and rural settings, though more
progressively. Agricultural areas practice the "good husbandry rule," which allows the
upstream owner to modify flows as long as he does not injure his neighbor. A reasonable use
rule is practiced in urban and suburban areas, balancing the benefit to the dominant estate
with the detriment to the servient estate. Dovin v.Winfield Township, 517 N.E.2d 1119,1124
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
72. PETERG. ROWE, MAKING AMIDDLELANDSCAPE217-47 (1991); RalphG. Martin, A New
Lifestyle, in SUBURBIA INTRANSrOn 15 (L. Masotti &J.Hadden eds., 1974); DAVIDC.THORNS,
SUBURBIA 19-34 (1972).
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IV. CAUSES OF ACTION AND REMEDIES
The flooding of private property has been characterized as a
trespass, a nuisance, and a taking, depending on both the courts and
circumstance. The nature of the cause of action will determine the
appropriate remedy, and often the success of the lawsuit against a
municipality.' Causes of action may be pled in the alternative.'
Invasion of property is the essence of an action in trespass. Damage
is not a prerequisite to such an action. The mere intrusion of waters upon
the surface is sufficient to diminish the right of the landowner to exclusive
possession of his property. For municipal liability, however, the plaintiff
must show that the intrusion was the result of a volitional action by the
municipality, and that the breach was direct and immediate. 5 An argument
can be made that city approval of a building permit is not an immediate
and direct cause of flooding. Black's Law Dictionary has defined
"immediate" as meaning "directly connected; not secondary or
remote... ,"76 The Nebraska Supreme Court has fleshed out the definition,
stating, "the proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in a natural
and continuous sequence without any efficient, intervening cause,
produces the injury and without which the injury would not have
occurred. " 7

One Texas court held, in the context of a nuisance action, that the
approval of upstream development was not the direct cause of floodingrelated erosion of the plaintiff's property-rainfall was!' A more
appropriate analysis would have been a "but for" approach, in which the
court questions whether flooding would have occurred without the
intervention of upstream development.
More commonly, plaintiffs claim actual damage and therefore
allege negligence by the municipality. This raises problems of proof. While
the damages may be simply proven, even in jurisdictions favoring
municipal liability for flooding, it is more difficult to prove the hydrologic
connection between increased development and flooding. Thus in Steuben

73. Naturally, if the upstream owner has a right of discharge, such as under the civil rule
or common enemy rule, no action at all will arise per law. See LaPuzza v. Sedlacek, 353
N.W.2d 17, 18 (Neb. 1984) (holding that owners of upper estate who did not alter natural
course of surface waters were not liable to lower landowners for damage from increased

flow).
74. See, e.g., Steuben v. City of Lincoln, 543 N.W.2d 161 (Neb. 1996) (plaintiffs asserted
claim of negligence, and, in the alternative, inverse condemnation).
75. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1503(6th ed. 1990).
76. Id. at 749.
77. Moore v. State, 515 N.W.2d 423,428 (Neb. 1994).
78. Dalon v. City of DeSoto, 852 S.W.2d 530,539 (Tex. App. 1992).
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v. City of Lincoln," the lack of a qualified expert witness on hydrology
proved fatal to a claim that waters from city-approved subdivisions and a
golf course were the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' flood damage. In
Curtisv. Town of Clinton,seven though subdivision developmentmay have
contributed to flooding of the appellant's property, the appellant was
unable to refute evidence that its contribution was insignificant. And, in
Kemper v. Don Coleman, Jr.,81" the plaintiffs' complaint did not allege that
flooding was caused by the permitting of upstream development, nor did
the evidence establish the facts necessary to prove such an allegation.
Specificity of both complaint and proof are required.
Sovereign immunity may prevent plaintiffs from obtaining relief
via nuisance or trespass actions. The alternative is to petition for inverse
condemnation. 2 Because the source of inverse condemnation is
constitutional-i.e., the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that people be
compensated for all takings of public property taken for public
use-sovereign immunity does not prevent recovery. 3 Often state
constitutions grant a similar, or sometimes broader, relief. The Georgia
Court of Appeals observed that
[w]here a county causes, creates, or maintains a nuisance
which amounts to an inverse condemnation, the county is
liable in damages that would be recoverable in an action for
inverse condemnation....The reason sovereign immunity is
not applicable when a nuisance amounts to a taking of
property of one of its citizens for public purposes is that
inverse condemnation is a form of eminent domain.8

79. 543 N.W.2d at 163-64.
80. 583 N.Y.S.2d 646, 648 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
81. 746 So. 2d 11, 16 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
82. Inverse condemnation is defined as "[aln action broughtbya propertyowner seeking
just compensation for land taken for a public use, against a government or private entity
having the power of eminent domain. It is a remedy peculiar to the property owner and is
exercisable by him where it appears the taker of the property does not intend to bring eminent
domain proceedings." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 75, at 825. Where sovereign
immunity bars recovery in nuisance or trespass, it is only through inverse condemnation that
a property owner may recover damages. Canfield v. Cook County, 445 S.E.2d 375, 376 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1994). Note that while Texas is very protective of its municipalities' immunity from
liability for flood damages in nuisance, in Kite v. City of Westworth Village,853 S.W.2d 200,201
(Tex. App. 1993), the Court of Appeals ruled that a plaintiff could recover on its inverse
condemnation claim alleging that flooding resulted from the city's approval of a subdivision
plat.
83. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
84. Fielder v. Rice Construction Co., 522 S.E.2d 13, 15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (citations
omitted).
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A state, however, may impose reasonable procedural prerequisites before
an aggrieved landowner files an inverse condemnation claim, or it may
provide no state remedy at all and limit landowners to the federal
remedy.
The question becomes, When does municipal flooding become a
taking, as distinguished from a trespass or a nuisance? As noted above, in
physical invasion cases, any physical occupation of the land is a taking for
which compensation must be paid. This concept, however, has both spatial
and temporal facets. One or two flooding incidents do not meaningfully
take away from a landowner's right to sole possession of his property.
M To prove inverse
Instead, recourse lies in nuisance or trespass."
condemnation, a landowner must establish a strong probability of future
flooding, not just damage to the land capable of restoration.' The entire
property need not be taken for an inverse condemnation claim to succeed.
Inverse condemnation is proper where the value of the land has been
diminished, because the measure of compensation is the loss in value from
the intrusion.' Through a successful inverse condemnation claim, a
landowner surrenders absolute possession of the portion of the property
that is "taken" in exchange for compensation from the governmental entity.
A municipality cannot completely void an inverse condemnation
claim by correcting the problem or modifying its police power regulations.
In such circumstances, the municipality is still liable to the landowner for
a temporary taking, compensating the victim for a temporary loss.89 Nor
can it avoid inverse condemnation through a subsequent action in eminent
domain. The size of compensation in an eminent domain action should
merely reflect the diminished value of the property from the previous
inverse condemnation.'
Inverse condemnation provides a powerful, but incomplete,
plaintiff's tool. It restricts recovery to the value of the property taken.
Where future flooding is uncertain it may provide no remedy at all. But, it
does overcome municipal immunity, and because recovery is based upon
physical invasion of the land, it allows recovery without any showing of
negligence, or even of physical damage.

85. Drake v. Town of Sanford, 643 A.2d 367,369 (Me. 1994). Maine's constitution does
not provide for compensation for takings. Before pursuing a federal remedy, an injured
property owner must first follow the state procedure for seeking compensation. Id.
86. Hawkins v. City of LaGrande, 843 P.2d 400 (Or. 1992).
87. Marty v. State, 838 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Idaho 1992); Menick v. City of Menasha, 547
N.W.2d 778,781 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
88. See generally Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
89. See Williams v. City of Central, 907 P.2d 701, 704 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (citing First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)). See also
Maloley v. City of Lexington, 536 N.W.2d 916,921 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995).
90. Andersen v. Village of Little Chute, 549 N.W.2d 737,743 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
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V. TWO CASE STUDIES
Georgia and Washington have developed their case law on
municipal flood liability more than perhaps all others, but with different
results. The Georgia Supreme Court has stressed issues of community
responsibility and fairness in its decisions, while the Washington courts
have adhered to sovereign immunity and stare decisis. The different
approaches of these states provide a counterpoint useful in understanding
the development of the law in this field.
A. Georgia: Stumbling in the Right Direction
Georgia has consistently held that municipalities managing a
sewerage system have a concurrent duty to maintain the system to
accommodate flows resulting from additional development, so as not to
cause a nuisance to adjoining private property.91 Perhaps the most widely
cited case on the subject is City of Columbus v. Myszka,. in which the
Georgia Supreme Court applied the doctrine of discretionary nonfeasance
to hold that the City of Columbus could be held liable for both
compensatory and punitive damages caused by the discharge of sewage
across Myszka's property as a result of the city's approval of upstream
development. As a per curiam opinion, the decision is short onexplanation,
such that the reader is left with little more than the cause and effect
rationale of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Eschete.93
The Georgia Supreme Court clarified, or depending on one's
perspective, mystified Myszka in 1984 in Fulton County v. Wheaton." There,
the county knew of flooding problems created by upstream development,

91. Columbus v. Smith, 316 S.E.2d 761,766 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984), City of Lawrenceville v.
Heard, 391 S.E.2d 441,443-44 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
92. 272 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. 1980) (per curiam). In 1984, the City of Columbus again paid the
price of poor planning. In Columbus v. Smith, 316 S.E.2d at 766, the Georgia Court of Appeals
first found that the continuous discharge of water over the plaintiff's property was a
continuous trespass, which was the equivalent of a continuing nuisance. Next, it quoted City

of Atlanta v. Williams, 128 S.E.2d 41 (Ga. 1962), stating, "[i]f the city claims the right to use the
drainage [system] then it is under a duty to maintain it so that the content and flow of the
surface waters [do] not overflow to the damage of the adjacent property owners." Columbus
v. Smith, 316 S.E.2d at 766. The Court on one hand thereby adopted the ownership rule. Its
liability was contingent upon its control over the drainage system creating the nuisance. In

an earlier case, City of Macon v. Cannon, 79 S.E.2d 816, 821 (Ga. Ct. App. 1954), the Georgia
Court of Appeals found that the City of Macon was liable for flooding damages from runoff
caused in part by the paving of two city streets.
93. Eschete v. City of New Orleans, 245 So. 2d 383 (La. 1971).
94. Fulton County v. Wheaton, 310 S.E.2d 910 (Ga. 1984), overruled on other grounds by

DeKalb County v. Orwig, 402 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. 1991).
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yet persisted in issuing building permits, worsening the problem. The court
pronounced, " [h ]owever, liability of a municipality cannot arise solely from
its approval of construction projects which increase surface water runoff.
Rather, it is the county's failure to maintain properly the culvert, resulting
in a nuisance, which creates liability."95
In the context of the controversy, the court's words in Fulton
County mean that a city issuing building permits has a corresponding duty
to insure adequate drainage to handle the runoff from the newly paved
areas, and it is the breach of that duty that is the basis of a cause of action.
The Fulton County language was approved without additional explanation
in Hibbs v. City of Riverdale.' Unfortunately, on remand in Hibbs, the
Georgia Court of Appeals divorced the Fulton County quotation from its
context and used the literal language so as to require an actual defective
water conveyance system for liability. The court of appeals said, "As the
Supreme Court noted, the City assumed no responsibility for any nuisance
created by the subdivision's stream drainage systems merely because it
approved the construction project." In fact, under the court of appeals'
reading of Fulton County, whether the city improperly approved building
permits becomes irrelevant, since the maintenance of a faulty sewer alone
becomes the basis for liability.' Under this misinterpretation, the only
questions are whether the city has ownership or control over the drainage
system, and if so, whether it was negligent in its maintenance of that
system. The intent implied in both Myszka andFulton County that a city has
some liability for the consequences of its planning decisions has been
eviscerated by the lower court. One can only hope that the Georgia
Supreme Court will soon provide an unambiguous declaration of its intent.
B. Washington: Consistent, but Consistently Wrong
The cases from the state of Washington have, until recently,
consistently opposed any municipal liability for planning decisions. Only
recently did a Washington court uphold municipal liability for planning
errors, although under the guise of the natural watercourse doctrine.

95. Id.at910,911.
96. Hibbs v. City of Riverdale, 478 S.E.2d 121, 122 (Ga. 1996).
97. Hibbs v. City of Riverdale, 490 S.E.2d 436,437 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); accord Provost v.
Gwinnett County, 405 S.E.2d 754,756 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991), in which the court of appeals said,
"Since the evidence showed only that GwinnettCounty had approved PKP's upstream project
and did not show a taking or damaging of appellants' property as the result of Gwinnett
County's maintenance of its downstream culvert, the trial court correctly granted a directed
verdict in favor of Gwinnett County."
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In the leading case of Laurelon Terrace v. City of Seattle," the
Washington Supreme Court adopted the natural watercourse doctrine: "It
is well settled that the flow of surface waters along natural drains may be
hastened or incidentally increased by artificial means, so long as the water
is not diverted from its natural watercourse onto the property of another."'
As to municipal liability for its expansion, the court went on to quote the
Kentucky case of City of Bowling Green v. Stevens: "The rule has been
applied in favor of a municipal corporation, and its right to carry off
surface water in order to improve the streets and render its territory more
suitable for building purposes has been recognized... ."" Under Laurelon
Terrace, a city is only liable if (a) the city diverts flood waters from their
natural course or (b) the city requires a landowner to connect to the city
sewer system but then maintains inadequate capacity to prevent flooding
or backing up onto the landowner's property."' 1 The Laurelon Terrace
decision implies that a city assumes a duty of care toward its utility
customers that it does not owe to the public at large. Furthermore,
Washington's definition of "natural course" appears to include areas that
have been flooded by excess drainage. The consequence to the landowner
is the same, regardless of whether the floodwaters reach the property by
natural or artificial path.
Washington's reliance upon City of Bowling Green provides a
flawed foundation for its doctrine. In 1943, nineteen years after City of
Bowling Green but nine years before LaurelonTerrace,the Kentucky Supreme
Court reversed its position on the natural watercourse doctrine in the case
of City of Louisville v. Cope, wherein the Kentucky Supreme Court decided
that a city that undertakes the obligation to build a sewer system also
undertakes the obligation to maintain and upgrade that system in order to
accommodate growth. 2 As City of Bowling Green has been negated so
should have Washington's position, especially since the Bowling Green
opinion is devoid of logical support.
To the contrary, 22 years after Laurelon Terrace, the Washington
Supreme Court expanded its rule to exonerate cities from liability for
general development."°
A municipality ordinarily is not liable for consequential
damages occurring when it increases the flow of surface
water onto an owner's property if the damages arise wholly

98.
1963).
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

246 P.2d 1113 (Wash. 1952). See also Strickland v. City of Seattle, 385 P.2d 33 (Wash.
Laurelon Terrace v. City of Seattle, 246 P.2d at 1119.
Id. (quoting City of Bowling Green v. Stevens, 265 S.W. 495 (Ky. 1924)).
Id. at 1118.
City of Louisville v. Cope, 176 S.W.2d 390,391 (Ky. 1943).
Wilber Dev. Corp. v. Les Rowland Const., Inc., 523 P.2d 186, 188 (Wash. 1974).
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from changes in the character of the surface produced by the
opening of streets, building of houses, and the like, in the
ordinary and 4regular course of the expansion of the
municipality1
As with Pennsylvania, Washington fails to define what is meant by
"ordinary and regular course," or to explain why it provides special
immunity for a municipality.
In Pattersonv. City of Bellevue,1" the Washington Court of Appeals
sidestepped that need for explanation by quoting Baldwin v. Overland Park,
holding that even where rapid urban growth has occurred, recourse is in
the political, not the judicial, arena. The PattersonCourt also added another
element to the plaintiffs proof against a city: to prove negligence the
plaintiff must show that the city owed and breached a duty against the
plaintiff as distinguished from the public at large-apparently adopting the
public duty doctrine much as the Virginia Circuit Court of Appeals did in
Linda Lee v. Covington Co. °6 Even applying these doctrines, Patterson
reached a questionable result. The case involved the creation of sewers that
increased the rate of stream flow at least 33 percent beyond the natural
capacity of the stream. Because the purpose of the ordinance in question
was the creation of a public utility and not flood control, the court held that
no duty was owed to protect riparian owners from flooding."° Moreover,
because the plaintiff's assertion, supported by an expert's affidavit, spoke
in terms of an increased rate of flow reaching the plaintiff's property, the
court held the plaintiffs proof deficient for not alleging an increase in the
quantity of the water reaching the plaintiffs property."
Immunity was again extended in Gainesv. Pierce County, where the
Washington Court of Appeals declared that a municipality owes no duty
of care for drainage accumulating on subdivisions approved by the
municipality, unless the municipality accepts ownership or control over
that drainage." That court reiterated its position in Hoover v. PierceCounty,
stating that for a municipality to be liable to a landowner, the municipality
must have collected the water by artificial means, channeled the water, and
then deposited the water on private property, causing damage.11

104. Id. at 188.
105. Patterson v. City of Bellevue, 681 P.2d 266,267 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
106. Id. at 267; Linda Lee v. Covington Co., 36 Va. Cir. 590 (1993).
107. There is a federal analogy to Washington's approach. The Food Control Act of 1928
has been interpreted to provide immunity for actions at federal dams constructed for the sole
purpose of flood prevention, rather than dams constructed for other purposes, such as
recreation. Hall, supra note 25, at 84.
108. Patterson, 681 P.2d at 267.
109. Gaines v. Pierce County, 834 P.2d 631,634-35 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
110. Hoover v. Pierce County, 903 P.2d 464,468 (Wash Ct. App. 1995).
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More recently, the Washington Supreme Court has used the
common-enemy doctrine to justify municipal authority to pass excess
runoff to downstream landowners. "[M]unicipal rights and liabilities as to
surface waters are the same as those of private landowners within the
city."111 Such a holding confuses the status of the city. When the city is
performing governmental functions, or even proprietary functions, such as
approval of subdivisions, it is not acting as a landowner. Therefore, its duty
of care should be defined in terms of the proper exercise of its
governmental function-i.e., did it exercise proper care in approving the
subdivisions? Did it owe a duty of care to consider or mitigate increased
flows from new development before approving those developments? If so,
did its failure to do so rise to the level of negligence?
Peculiarly, two years after the Hoover decision, the Washington
Court of Appeals, in Phillips v. King County,1 2 upheld a claim of inverse
condemnation against King County for a development whose discharge
resulted in a "flowage easement" over the plaintiff's property. The court
quoted the 1962 case of Buxel v. King County,"3 saying,
It is an exception to the general rule of nonliability, in that a
municipality is liable if, in the course of an authorized
construction, it collects surface water by an artificial channel,
or in large quantities, and pours it, in a body, upon the land
of a private person, to his injury. Under this rule, while
municipal authorities may pave and grade streets and are not
ordinarily liable for an increase in surface water naturally
falling on the land of a private owner where the work is
properly done, they are not permitted to concentrate and
gather such water into artificial drains or channels and throw
it on the land of an individual owner in such manner and
volume as to cause substantial injury to such land and
without making adequate provision for its proper outflow,
unless compensation is made, and for breach of duty in this
respect an action will lie.' 4
The court of appeals' slight moderation of its no-liability stance
proved too radical for the Washington Supreme Court, which reversed the
Phillips decision a year later, forcefully stating,
There is no public aspect when the County's only action is to
approve a private development under then existing

111.

Phillips v. King County, 968 P.2d 871, 877 (Wash. 1998) (quoting 18A EUGENE

MCQUILLIN, LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.140 (3d ed. 1993). Compare Wilson v.

Ramacher, 352 N.W.2d 389,394 (Minn. 1984).
112.
113.
114.

943 P.2d 306,318 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
374 P.2d 250 (Wash. 1962).
Phillips v. King County, 943 P.2d 306,319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
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regulations. Furthermore, the effect of such automatic
liability would have a completely unfair result. If the county
or city were liable for the negligence of a private developer,
based on approval under existing regulations, then the
municipalities, and ultimately the taxpayers, would become
the guarantors or insurers for the actions of private
developers whose development damages neighboring
properties....
We hold that county's acceptance of a drainage system for
maintenance does not give rise to liability based on the
developer's obsolete design. However, we hold that a county
which allows a private developer to construct a drainage
facility on public land, or land subject to public control,
which acts to channel surface water onto adjacent property,
may be liable in inverse condemnation if the plaintiff can
prove liability under existing law regarding
dispersal of
5
surface waters and consequent damages."1
In its decision, the Washington Supreme Court did not discriminate
between those cases in which a developer has negligently constructed a
drainage system from those cases in which the municipality had no
business approving development or approving a poorly designed system,
because flooding would result. In short, the court missed the point. The
purposes of municipal liability are to make the injured party whole and to
deter future harmful conduct by the municipality. Municipal liability is not
about governmental units serving as guarantors of the actions of private
developers, but rather as guarantors of their own permitting decisions.
Juxtaposed to the Phillipscase, the Washington Supreme Court did
hold for the plaintiffs in one recent case, DiBlasi v. City of Seattle. 16 In
DiBlasi,the court held that cities were liable for water running off of city
streets and artificial conveyances. In the context of the court's previous
cases, I assume that cities will not be liable for water that originates in
developments but happens to get channeled onto public conveyances.
Until the Washington Supreme Court's decision in Phillips,
Washington's courts consistently failed to question the underlying
principles governing the doctrines they apply. In Phillips,the Court at least
contemplates a rationale for municipal immunity-cost to the taxpayers.
Now, it is time for the state of Washington to take the next step: weigh
whether the burdens of flooding should be borne individually or societally.
In addition, Washington should weigh whether the aggregate burden will
be expanded or diminished if municipalities are held liable for their

115. Phillips v. King County, 968 P.2d 871, 878,882 (Wash. 1998).
116. 969 P.2d 10 (Wash. 1998).
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permitting decisions. The courts should recognize that the current rule of
immunity is judicially made, and because it is judicially made, it can be
judicially modified. It is time to move beyond Baldwin. The common law
routinely assigns rights and liabilities to parties. In the absence of
legislative initiative, municipal liability for flooding is a judicial question.
Stare decisis is not a reason for immunity.
VI. THE SOLUTION
A. A Proposed Rule of Municipal Flood Liability
How then do we tailor the law of municipal liability for flooding
to (1) make urban development compatible with the hydrologic cycle, (2)
protect landowners from harm caused by poorly planned development,
and (3) create a doctrine of law that is grounded in both natural systems
and logic, and not one predicated upon false or outdated distinctions?
Urban sprawl transforms flood control from a local problem into
a regional problem.117 Each municipality should be responsible for its
contribution to downstream flow. The largest defect in Pennsylvania's
LaForm decision was the lack of congruence between political boundaries
and hydrologic boundaries. Downstream communities should not be at the
mercy of upstream communities. After all, they are subdivisions of the
same sovereign.
With the gradual erosion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
policy can now guide the common law to charge municipalities with
liability for flood damages caused by poor planning and permitting
decisions. I propose a rule to this effect here. As a predicate, I acknowledge
it would be unfair to give municipalities ex post facto liability for their past
planning sins when they operated under various water discharge rules and
rules of immunity, except where, as in Colorado, Georgia, and Nevada, the
state has already created such liability. Cities should not now be prejudiced
by past reliance upon a century of precedent, nor should they fall victim to
a flood tide of flood-related tort litigation. Therefore, this doctrine should
only take effect prospectively. Below, I outline the elements of a plan for
municipal liability.
Municipalitiesbear the blame and responsibilityfor flooding resulting
from negligent planning decisions made from this point onward. In a crowded
world, the duty of care should be defined broadly. One person's actions are
likely to affect the lives of others. Cities owe a duty of care to all who live

117. In James A. Kushner, Growth Management and the City, 12 YALEL. &POL'Y REV. 68, 6892 (1994), Kushner argues that to effectively manage the growth of urban areas, decisions as
to the staging of new development must be made on a regional basis.
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downstream or down-ditch of urban water collection, whether the
conveyances be natural or artificial.
The issuance of building permits does not create municipal liabilityfor
defects in buildingconstruction."8 It is the fact of construction that causes the
flooding. This is distinct from city approval of a building with a weak roof.
Moreover, it is the city that often provides the vehicle for damage, where
floodwaters are conveyed by inadequate municipal sewers. If the approved
permit provides for sufficient drainage but the builder fails to conform to
approved plans, it is the builder, not the city, that bears responsibility for
flooding, unless, of course, the city negligently certifies the development
as constructed.
Cities cannot plead ignoranceof the consequences of development. They
should be deemed negligent if they approve development that increases
water flow if the current drainage system is inadequate to handle it, or if
they build drainage systems inadequate to handle existing or anticipated
development. To avoid liability, cities are encouraged to implement
stormwater runoff control ordinances that require developers to submit
stormwater management plans to local government agencies prior to plan
approval." 9
A city can no longer reasonably maintain that it has no obligation to
provide drainage. If it allows construction that increases the rates or
quantities of flows, it assumes a responsibility to mitigate the
consequences. The reasonable use rule should be applied to discharges
from urban and suburban areas, with high values placed on urban infilling
and preservation of open space.'2 This will make the law of municipal
flood liability consistent with the trend for private litigants favoring the
reasonable use doctrine. Although a number of jurisdictions profess to
adhere to the common-enemy and civil law doctrines, the modem private
litigant cases are few in which an upstream landowner is not held
accountable for injury inflicted upon the downstream owner by the
discharge of storm water.' Municipalities already have liability for their
118. See Garrett v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 447 N.E.2d 717,722 (N.Y. 1983) (finding that plaintiff
failed to assert facts necessary to establish the town's liability for a motel fire); Dutton v. Mitek
Realty Corp, 463 N.Y.S.2d 471 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (finding the town not liable to a
volunteer fireman who fell from the roof of a building lacking a safety barrier); Georges v.
Tudor, 556 P.2d 564, 566-67 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) ("We agree...that the city owed no duty
to appellant individually in issuing the building permit or in inspecting the Olympic Block
Building. To hold otherwise would cause the city to become a guarantor of each and every
construction project....").
119. See Frank E. Maloney et al., Stormwater Runoff Control:A Model Ordinancefor Meeting
Local Water Quality Management Needs, 20 NAT. REsoURCEsJ. 713,713-64 (1980).
120. PETER CALTHORPE, THE NEXr AMERICAN METROPOiS 31 (1993).
121. See, e.g., Millard Farms, Inc. v. Sprock, 829 S.W. 2d 1,3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Johnson
v. Phillips, 433 S.E. 2d 895, 899 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part on othergrounds
sub noma,
Smith v.Phillips, 458 S.E. 2d 427 (S.C. 1995); State v. Feenan, 752 P.2d 182,185 (Mont.
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polluting discharges under the federal Clean Water Act. Citizens may sue
dischargers, including municipalities, to obtain compliance, and may sue
the Environmental Protection Agency to compel enforcement of the Clean
Water Act.'" The United States Supreme Court has held that these citizen
actions have replaced common law rights to sue. 3
Municipal liability does not end at town borders. Unlike the LaForm
decision, a city may not allow its development to cause downstream
flooding directly or indirectly. It is unfair to allow a larger municipality to
cast its burden upon a smaller political subdivision less able to bear the
expense of flood control.
The act of natureor act of god defense will seldom be allowed. Cities will
not be responsible for flooding that would have occurred prior to new
planning decisions. Climatologists have predicted, however, greater storm
severity in the future. What was once a 100-year storm event may now
occur at 25-year intervals."2 Future planning exercises must accommodate
more significant storm events.
Liability is joint. Merely because a city now assumes liability for
flood damage does not exonerate developers from blame. Where there are
multiple upstream developments it may be impossible to apportion
liability, and in that case the city may have to take full responsibility for its
poor planning. But where relative negligence can be assigned, the finder of
fact should do so. Courts likewise should not exonerate downstream
from their assumption of the risk for building in flood prone
owners
1
areas. 25
Common lawdoctrinessuch as the naturalwatercourserule,government
ownership,and the distinctionsbetween proprietaryand governmentalffunctions
and between discretionaryand non-discretionaryfunctions areabrogratedinsofar
as they relate to flood liability. These doctrines detract from the focus on
causation, fairness, reasonable expectations, and duty of care. They
substitute doctrine for a balanced weighing of the public interest. They
serve to reduce the standards of urban planning.
1988). But see White v. Pima County, 775 P.2d 1154, 1160 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (flooding
caused by diking water behind defendant's property W4as held reasonable). It is only under
the cloak of sovereign immunity that the trend is reversed.
122. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §1365 (1994).
123. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,332 (1981).
124. Smith, supranote 2, at 320,330.
125. The principle of assumption of risk is as follows: "A plaintiff who voluntarily
assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot
recover for such harm." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965). The elements of
assumption of risk are "(1) knowledge by the plaintiff of the condition; (2) appreciation by the
plaintiff of the danger under the surrounding conditions and circumstances; and (3) the
plaintiffs failure to exercise reasonable care... and, with such knowledge and appreciation,
the plaintiff's putting himself into the way of danger." Slade v. City of Montgomery, 577
So. 2d 887,892 (Ala. 1991).
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B. Tools for Flood Control without Liability
To accomplish better flood control, municipalities have a number
of tools available: impose stricter building codes for properties within the
floodplain, thereby creating an economic disincentive to build in these
areas and also protect against damage in the event of flooding;" 6 build, or
require developers to build, retention ponds; 7 impose moratoria on new
development;1 2 downzone-reducing the intensity of development by
reducing building heights, increasing lot sizes, or imposing more restrictive
use classifications (these approaches should not be used if they will only
disperse development, because that would contribute to urban sprawl and
aggravate the flooding problem); impose permit caps-limit the number of
permits issued for a certain area in a given time period; timed sequential
zoning-permits for development of a particular section of a city are timed
so as to coincide with planned utility extension; 9 and purchase of open
space by the municipality." State legislatures can assist by expanding
municipal zoning powers.
The proposals advanced in this article will modify the dynamic
between city planners and builders, giving city planners a sword by which
they can refuse inappropriate development. They can shift the burden of
sewer development and expansion to the developer where the
development would otherwise cause a risk of flooding. Initially, there will
be litigation. Some builders will complain that their property has been
taken because they cannot obtain a building permit or because they must
dedicate a portion of their property for water retention. These lawsuits will
fail because government prevention of a nuisance or trespass does not
equal a taking."' Flooding of private property is a preventable nuisance."

126.

Responsible Citizens in Opposition to Flood Plain Ordinance v. City of Asheville, 302

S.E.2d 204,209 (N.C. 1983).
127. Retention ponds and sedimentation basins store water for gradual release or
evaporation; they also allow sediment time to drop out of suspension, resulting in less
clogging of drainage ditches and less force of floodwaters. See generally L.A.J. Fennessey &
A.R. Jarrett, The Dirt in a Hole: A Review ofSedimentation Basinsfbr UrbanAreas and Construction
Basins, 49 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 319 (1994). In some circumstances, artificial or

natural wetlands can serve these purposes.
128.

Kushner, supra note 117, at 71.

129.

Id.

130. Id. at 72.
131. In Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-31 (1992), the United States
Supreme Court suggested that police power prohibitions of common law nuisances do not
constitute takings because the landowners never had the right to perform the noxious use in
the first place.
132. See, e.g., State v. Feenan, 752 P.2d 182, 185 (Mont. 1988).
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The New Jersey courts have been accepting of limits on excessive
growth. In Lom-Ran Corp.v. Departmentof EnvironmentalProtection,", Little
Falls Township denied the plaintiff a sewer connection permit because its
sewage treatment plant was already over-extended. The New Jersey
Superior Court upheld the state environmental agency's denial of an
exemption to the plaintiff. The court held that under New Jersey law an
exemption had to be granted only when the other permits necessary for
development had already been obtained and substantial investment had
already been made. Further, in Cappture Realty Corporation v. Board of
Adjustment of the Borough of Elmwood Park," the court upheld an interim
zoning ordinance that created a moratorium on construction in a flood
prone area until the borough had time to complete scheduled flood control
projects. In C&D Partnershipv. City of Gahanna,the Ohio Court of Appeals
denied a suit for damages resulting from a city's delay in approving a
subdivision application, saying that there was no prejudice because had the
city acted within 30 days it would have been justified in denying the
application because of legitimate concerns about flooding." Implicit in the
Ohio decision is that flooding potential is a legitimate basis for permit
denial. It is also worth noting that the Federal Clean Water Act expressly
provides for moratoria on sewage hook-ups where additional input to a

133. 394 A.2d 1233,1236-37 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
134. Cappture Realty Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 313 A.2d 624,631 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1973), afd, 336 A.2d 30 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975). Unanswered in the Cappture
decision is whether municipalities have an obligation to constructdrainage facilities necessary
to accommodate future development. In Maine, moratoria are also allowed; however, they
must be prospective and they cannot be applied to existing building applications, even if the
new development will exceed present sewer capacity. Cumberland Village Housing Assocs.
v. Town of Cumberland, 609 F. Supp. 1481, 1487 (D.C. Me. 1985). In San Antonio River
Authority v. GarrettBrothers,528 S.W.2d 266,270-71,273 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975), the denial of a
permit to connect a subdivision to the sewerage system after substantial investment had been
made was upheld as the basis for a damage award against the municipal utility. The case
seems to be decided on a takings theory as there is little discussion of whether the denial was
a proper exercise of police power authority. The precedential value of this case is ambiguous.
The Virginia Supreme Court, on the other hand, reached a different conclusion. When Fairfax
County implemented a moratorium on the issuance of site plans and subdivision plats in an
attempt to cope with rapid growth, the court found that zoning and moratoria were distinct
from each other. Lacking express legislative authority to issue a moratorium, the county's
action was struck down. Bd. of Supervisors v. Home, 215 S.E.2d 453, 456-57 (Va. 1975). Accord
Bittinger v. Corp. of Bolivar, 395 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1990). However, in Brazos Land, Inc. v. Bd.
of County Comm'rs, 848 P.2d 1095, 1101 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993), the New Mexico Court of
Appeals upheld Rio Arriba County's moratorium on subdivision approval, stating that the
moratorium was supported by the state legislature's broad grant of police powers to the
counties.
135. No. 82AP-919,1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 15225, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1983).

Fall 20011

DEVELOPMENT-RELATED FLOODING

sewage system will result in unlawful pollution.13 Such moratoria have
been upheld by the federal courts.137
Like New Jersey, New York has consistently and liberally upheld
temporary moratoria on issuing building permits." New York's Court of
Appeals has also favorably adjudicated the legality of staged growth in
accordance with a municipal master plan based upon the limits of
infrastructure capacity.'" Yet, where it is clear that zoning restrictions were
not reasonably related to a legitimate purpose, they have been found
unconstitutional and invalid." ° Likewise, for a moratorium to be sustained,
it must be tied to a plan to provide adequate infrastructure in the future so
as to guarantee that the moratorium is temporary. 41
Despite the plentiful case law on the subject, no case has tested
how long a temporary restriction is too permanent. Nor have any cases
decided whether growth must be allowed in cities too poor to expand their
infrastructure burden in the foreseeable future. Must a city such as
Columbus, Georgia, which has already gone deeply into debt to improve
its deficient sewage system, burden its taxpayers even further to satisfy
developers' desires?" 2 Logic says no. Statutory obligations on the part of
a municipality to provide sewerage in the first place, and common law
obligations to update sewer systems, 143 need not impose a burden on
municipalities to accept additional burdens on utilities. An affirmative duty
upon cities to prevent flooding is not a carte blanche for developers to

136.. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(h) (1994).
137. See United States v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 930 F.2d 132,135-36 (1st Cir. 1991).
138. The lead case for this proposition is Charles v. Diamond, 360 N.E.2d 1295,1300 (N.Y.
1977), and it has been followed in a long series of more recent cases. See 119 Dev. Assocs. v.
Village of Irvington, 566 N.Y.S.2d 954 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); McDonald's Corp. v. Village of
Elmsford, 549 N.Y.S.2d 448 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Noghrey v. Acampora, 543 N.Y.S.2d 530
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989); West Lane Prop. v. Lombardi, 527 N.Y.S.2d 498 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988);
Turnpike Woods, Inc. v. Town of Stony Point, 503 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Dune
Assocs., Inc. v. Anderson, 500 N.Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Ozols v. Henry, 438
N.Y.S.2d 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Rhema Christian Fellowship v. Common Council, 452
N.Y.S.2d 292 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
139. Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291,294-95 (N.Y. 1972), appeal dismissed sub nom,
Rockland County Builders Assoc. v. McAlevey, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
140. In Jensen v. City of New York, 369 N.E.2d 1179, 1080-81 (N.Y. 1977), the court of
appeals struck down zoning that incorrectly placed the bulk of plaintiffs private property on
a city street map, making it ineligible for a building permit. In Svenningsen v. Passidimo,463
N.Y.S.2d 874,876 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), the state supreme court nullified a municipality's
conditioning of a sewer hook-up on a limitation of the number of parking spaces at the new
facility, because traffic would not burden the sewer system.
141. Schenck v. City of Hudson Village, 937 F. Supp. 679, 691, 693 (N.D. Ohio 1996). A
preliminary injunction was granted against the application of a municipal growth control
ordinance to developers who already had preliminary or final plat approval.
142. See Ken Edelstein, Expensive Solutionsfor Aging Sewers, GOVERNiNG, Feb. 1991, at 21.
143. See City of Louisville v. Cope, 176 S.W.2d 390,391 (Ky. 1943).
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demand infrastructure expansion. Developers can undertake the cost and
responsibility themselves. Their failure to do so is grounds for permit
denial if the development will cause unlawful or nuisance discharges. This
brings us full circle to the common law of drainage. If a municipality
upholds its duties in the permitting process, and new development still
adds to flooding, then under the reasonable use doctrine the new developer
remains liable for the injury or trespass it causes, and without negligence,
the city is immune from suit.
Where a statute expressly defines the criteria necessary for a
moratorium, state courts have construed local authority narrowly and have
only sustained an ordinance if it squarely satisfied the prerequisites.'" If a
permit moratorium is not a viable option for a community, it can still
design its zoning ordinance so as to deny any permit application that
would result in a flooding nuisance.
Less onerous flood-related restrictions than moratoria have been
sustained. North Carolina's Supreme Court upheld Asheville's ordinance
creating special requirements for buildings within a floodplain, as
necessary to obtain federal flood insurance under the National Flood
Insurance Act. 4" The burdens placed upon owners of the floodplain
property did not violate the equal protection provisions of the United
States and North Carolina constitutions: "The test is whether the difference
in treatment made by the law has a reasonable basis in relation to the
purpose and subject matter of the legislation."'" The court also found the
City of Asheville's ordinance did not effect a taking, because, while it may
have diminished the value of the property, it did not render the property
valueless.'47
Other litigants have unsuccessfully claimed property takings
against federal and state agencies where federal and state regulations set

144. The New Jersey Superior Court, in Toll Bros., Inc. v. West Windsor Township, 712 A.2d
266, 270-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1998), struck the portion of Section 90(b) of the New Jersey
Municipal Land Use Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-90(b) (West 1991) allowing moratoria if
"a clear imminent danger to the health of the inhabitants exists." The California Court of
Appeals has ruled similarly:
We conclude section 65858 is clear. It authorizes a city to prohibit any uses
which may be in conflict with a general plan being studied so long as the
city makes a finding the approval of additional subdivisions and other
entitlements of use would result in a current and immediate threat to the
public health, safety, or welfare. Nothing in that section permits a city to
prohibit the formal processing of development applications, such as the
tentative subdivision map. Accordingly, the city's ordinance is invalid.
Bldg. Indus. Legal Defense Found. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 834 (Cal. Ct.
App.1999).
145. Responsible Citizens v. City of Asheville, 302 S.E.2d 204,212 (N.C. 1983).
146. Id. (quoting Guthrie v. Taylor, 185 S.E.2d 193 (N.C. 1971)).
147. Id. at 209-12.
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standards that made it harder for developers to obtain building permits
from municipalities. In Adolph v. FederalEmergency Management Agency,"
Plaquemines Parish Louisiana passed a building elevation ordinance to
comply with FEMA National Flood Insurance Program regulations. And
in HBP Associates v. State of New York, the New York Department of
Environmental Conservation withstood an inverse condemnation claim
where its regulations prohibited Orange County from approving a sewer
hook-up because of pollution.4 9 These cases suggest that regulations at the
state or federal scale may successfully provide a base of support for
municipal action.
In conclusion, a municipality may not be compelled to issue
permits for construction where such construction will create a nuisance.
Since some municipalities may lack moratorium authority, their ordinances
should require permit applicants to demonstrate that their development
will not exceed the capacity of the existing system or will not cause
flooding such as would cause a nuisance. Just as spot zoning is
prohibited,1" availability of sewerage capacity ought to be part of a
comprehensive municipal plan and should not be allocated on an ad hoc
basis.
VII. CONCLUSION
Municipal flood liability creates several consequences. It
encourages infilling-or construction in previously developed areas, where
the new development contributes less runoff because the area may already
be paved and sewer lines in place. This infilling preserves the urban core
and consumes less transportation energy. It reduces private property
damage. It increases the area reserved for retention ponds and preserves
wetland areas for water absorption.
The question of municipal liability for flooding is only one facet of
increasing
tension between property rights and the need for orderly
the
planning in an increasingly urban and crowded society. As municipalities
compete for tax revenues, they encourage building and paving at the
expense of flood control. As they seek to minimize the services they
provide, increase their tax base, and exclude undesirable people, they zone
for large lots, and thereby extend urban sprawl. The fear of takings claims
and other lawsuits makes cities reluctant to deny building permits and
utility hook-ups. The net result is that pre-existing owners of property face
more flooding from urban and suburban development. Add the prospect
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of increasing storm severity caused by global climate change, and the
economic consequence to American cities is enormous.
Property owners will lose either way. Increased governmental
regulation bites into the bundle of "rights" associated with title. Yet, the
risk of becoming victim to flooding deprives one of the security inherent
in land ownership. A person's view on this issue may depend on whether
he or she has already developed a property, or hopes to in the future. Since
property rights suffer in either scenario, the logical solution lies in what
best serves the common good.
That choice is clear. The fulfillment of reasonable expectations,
taking responsibility for the consequences of one's actions, and not
unreasonably causing harm to others, all point in the direction of better
flood control planning. This means that municipalities must adopt a more
active role in planning. The threat of tort or eminent domain liability is the
incentive to encourage municipalities to take that more active role. A rule
of prospective liability may yield some additional litigation, but a city
whose planners act reasonably will not be overly burdened. These expenses
will surely be offset by reductions in flood damages and flood insurance.
Transaction costs decrease when the rights of property owners are clear.
Better planning by the government should reduce private litigation over
flooding.

